Eisenhower Foresees Ruin For NATO in French Plan

By ROBERT H. PHELPS
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GETTYSBURG, Pa., Sept. 10—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower said today that he did not see how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could survive if France carried out her plan for ending the alliance's joint military command.

In an interview at his office on the Gettysburg College campus, he praised President de Gaulle as the man who had saved France from Communism and as a free world leader who should be listened to.

But he said the alternative to the integrated defense system, from which General de Gaulle has announced France will pull out in 1969, was a coalition of separate forces.

And, the former supreme commander of NATO forces warned, "coalitions in the past have always failed."

In the interview General Eisenhower also discussed a number of disclosures he makes in his forthcoming book, "Waging Peace, 1956-1960," which will be published by Doubleday & Co. Excerpts from the book—the second volume of his Presidential memoirs, "The White House Years"—will appear in The New York Times starting Sept. 20.

Doodling on a yellow legal-sized paid, the 74-year-old former President recalled the following aspects of his second Administration:

¶President Mohammed Ayub Khan had been "more flexible" than Prime Minister Nehru in regard to the Kashmir question.

¶The United States was ready in 1958 to use small-yield atomic bombs against Communist China's air fields, if necessary, to save the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

¶The invitation for Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to visit the United States in the summer of 1959 was extended by Under Secretary of State Robert U. Murphy as the result of a "misinterpretation" of the President's intentions.

¶The Central Intelligence Agency's tardiness in reporting that Fidel Castro was a Communist irritated General Eisenhower.

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General Eisenhower

¶The United States sent high-flying reconnaissance planes, possibly U-2's, over Israel, Syria and Egypt during the crisis over the United Arab Republic's seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956.

Discusses Motives

Hunching over his brown leather-top desk and swiftly drawing a series of checkmarks on his yellow pad, General Eisenhower warmly praised General de Gaulle's accomplishments. If not for General de Gaulle, he said, France would be not just "chaotic," but Communist.

He said the United States must recognize President de Gaulle's problems and his driving motive: restoration of "the honor, prestige and glory of France."

There is also a vital strategic reason for listening to General de Gaulle. France's geographical position is a key one in Europe, he noted, and the supply bases needed for an allied army are on French soil. Without France, he said, NATO would be in a difficult military position.

The de Gaulle plan would add to the burdens of the small countries of Europe, General Eisenhower said: Each one would have to have its own army, navy and air force and perhaps even its own nuclear unit, and that "doesn't make sense."

As for the alternative — to find a way to bring these national forces under an effective control—"I don't see how they can do it," the former President emphasized, and then uttered his warning about the failure of past coalitions.

Suggests French Command

One possible solution, General Eisenhower said, would be the appointment of a French general as supreme commander of an integrated NATO force. An American has always commanded the NATO military organization since it was set up in 1951 under General Eisenhower.

When asked about the Indian-Pakistani conflict, General Eisenhower recalled that he visited both countries in 1959 and had been impressed by President Ayub and Prime Minister Nehru. Both leaders, he said, indicated that their differences over the division of the waters of the Hindus River between Pakistan and India could be solved, but that Kashmir was in a different category.

While he took pains to emphasize that he wanted to remain neutral, General Eisenhower said he thought that at the time his impression was that President Aub was somewhat "more flexible" on the question. In his forthcoming book, General Eisenhower writes that Mr. Nehru discoursed at great length in December, 1956, on India's right to Kashmir, but never offered any reason for rejecting a plebiscite.

General Eisenhower leaned back in his chair, his hands locked behind his head, as the discussion turned to the possible use of the atomic bomb.

"It never occurred to me," he said, that the United States should not use atomic weapons if they would "best serve" the interests of the country. In some conceivable situations, he asserted, atomic weapons would be the only ones that could stop aggressors.

"Waging Peace" relates how the President and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, drafted a memorandum detailing the circumstances under which the United States might have to use atomic weapons against China. The memo was drawn up on Sept. 4, 1958, then studied and edited to avoid any misunderstanding. Communists had resumed shelling the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy and President Eisenhower writes that he wanted to make sure that the United States would be ready to react if the islands were invaded.

Loss of Asia Feared

The President and Mr. Dulles believed that the United States, to be successful, might "face the necesity of using small-yield atomic weapons against hostile airfields."

The memo added that while there would be popular revulsion against the United States in most of the world, it maght not last long if the bombs were exploded in the air, so that there would be no "appreciable" fallout or large civilian casualties.

Morevorer, the memo stressed, adverse world reaction might not be so lasting or so serious as the loss of most of Asia, which could follow Peking's capture of Quemoy and Matsu.

Once before President Eisenhower had drawn up plans for the possible use of atomic weapons against the Chinese Communists. In 1953, he let word leak out that unless a satisfactory armistice could be arranged in Korea, the United States would use its nuclear power to gain full victory. Shortly thereafter the Communist agreed to armistice terms.

As for the misunderstanding on the invitation to Premier Khrushchev to visit the United States, Mr. Eisenhower takes the blame.

The plan—in the President's mind—was designed to get the 1959 foreign ministers conference in Geneva moving. A hint would be passed along to the Soviet Premier that if the foreign ministers' conference made progress perhaps there could be an exchange of visits between him and President Eisenhower.

But Mr. Murphy did not attach such a condition when he extended the invitation in a conversation with Frol R. Kozlov, First Deputy Premier. Thus, Premier Khrushchev accepted the invitation and, even though the foreign ministers' parley bogged down President Eisenhower was forced to go through with the visit.

Temper Flared

The famous Eisenhower temper flared when Mr. Murphy told him he had attached no qualifications to the invitation. But, the President said in the interview, "I think that was my fault" in not making the intention clear.

In "Waging Peace" General Eisenhower writes that he was "provoked" because until the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency did not give him any suggestion that a Castro victory in Cuba might not be in the best interests of the United States.

In the interview he explained that he was not criticizing the C.I.A., because it had had a difficult job, since the anti-Castro reports, from friends of the currupt dictator Fulgencio Batista, were often suspect.

The use of high-flying reconnaissance planes during the Suez crisis was necessary, the President asserted in the interview, because Israel was getting [illegible] from France

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